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Descartes’ God is a Deceiver,
and that’s OK
Abstract
That Descartes’ God is not a deceiver is amongst the canonical claims
of early modern philosophy. The deep-cutting significance of this (pur-
ported) fact to the coherence of Descartes’ system is likewise canonical,
infused in both how we teach and think about the project of the Med-
itations. Prevalent as it is, both ends of this narrative are suspect. We
argue that Descartes’ color eliminativism, when coupled with his anal-
ysis of the cognitive structure of our sensory systems, entails that God
is a deceiver. It’s doubtful that Descartes recognized this, given his fre-
quent insistence that God is not a deceiver, and the role this plays in
his system. But we argue that this is a concession that Descartes can
grant, so long as we are careful about the kind of deception at play—a
kind of deception Descartes does seem to recognize, albeit not without
some ambiguity. On our story, Descartes’ metaphysics and epistemol-
ogy are not driven by concerns about deception per se, but by concerns
about God’s benevolence.
‘You say that God cannot lie or deceive. Yet




We’re often told that Descartes’ God is not a deceiver. We’re also told that
God’s non-deceptive nature secures the metaphysics and epistemology that
is foundational to Descartes’ philosophical system. That’s the prevailing wis-
dom. We aim to challenge it: in Descartes’ system, God is a deceiver. And
that’s perfectly OK.
We argue that Descartes must endorse:
SENSORY DECEPTION: Many sensations are deceptive such that they
are apt to produce false judgments, and their being so apt isn’t due to
our violating various epistemic norms or the mere finitude of mind-body
composites.
We can bridge Sensory Deception and God’s being a deceiver in three
main steps. The first concerns the benign observation that bodies look col-
ored. We have sensory experiences as of colored bodies. The second concerns
Descartes’ denial that bodies are colored, namely, his commitment to color
eliminativism.1 Putting these first and second points together, it follows that
color sensations are misleading. The third concerns a class of sensory judg-
ments to the e↵ect that bodies are colored that are immediately occasioned
by color sensations (Hatfield 1986; Simmons 2003; Patterson 2016). These
judgments are not just false; they are irrevisable, and our making them is
automatic, and so not a matter of some shortcoming on our part, epistemic
or otherwise. Since our sensory faculties are ultimately a product of God’s
design, Sensory Deception prima facie implies that God is a deceiver.
1While our argument focuses on color, it does not rely on color; the constraint is
eliminativism about sensory qualities, not color eliminativism. The focus on color has
theoretical and practical motivation; theoretical because color experiences deliver arguably
the least ambiguous phenomenological predictions (making assessments of non-veridicality
more tractable), and practical because Descartes had more to say about color than other
sensory qualities and our experiences thereof.
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There is a temptation to be dismissive here. One will insist that no matter
how the details are filled in, this argument is flawed, or Sensory Deception
is itself false. Never mind that Descartes often flatly denies that God is
a deceiver. God cannot be a deceiver, the thought goes, because God is
omniperfect. And with respect to our sensations, Descartes claims that God
was benevolent in giving them the function of preserving our health (Sixth
Meditation, AT VII: 83/CSM II: 57), and giving us the best of all possible
sensations to that end (Sixth Meditation, AT VII: 87-8/CSM II: 60).2
Yet there is certainly no immediate tie between being omniperfect and
being a non-deceiver, and nor is there an immediate tie between a type of
sensation being optimally suited to preserve our health and its being non-
deceptive. So these considerations fall far short of being decisive. On the other
hand, if God were the cause of a malicious or harmful form of deception, that
would be deeply problematic, so much so that this dismissive stance would
be warranted.
This latter observation leads to two claims. First: if God is a deceiver,
he better not be a malicious deceiver. Second: it’s question-begging to as-
sume that any form of deception is incompatible with God’s omniperfection.
Not everything that is deceptive is maliciously deceptive. And color sen-
sations, we’ll claim, are such a case. More specifically, color sensations are
non-intellectually, non-maliciously deceptive; non-intellectual because they
are only partially grounded in the intellect (a body is needed too–see Princi-
ples I.32, AT VIIIA: 17/CSM I: 204), and non-malicious because their being
deceptive does not cause harm.3
Our precisified thesis, then, is that God is a non-malicious deceiver, and
2We employ the following abbreviations: ‘AT’: Oeuvres de Descartes (cited by volume
and page), Adam and Tannery (1996); ‘CSM’: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes
(cited by volume and page), Cottingham et al. (1985); ‘CSMK’: The Philosophical Writings
of Descartes (cited by page), Cottingham et al. (1991).
3As we will see, there might be other ways in which deception conflicts with God’s
omniperfection—e.g. via potential conflicts with God’s omnipotence. However, our focus
will be on the relationship between malice, harm, and omnibenevolence.
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that if Descartes were to admit this, it would be perfectly OK.4 Our case
will begin with a brief overview of color eliminativism and its place in the
secondary literature. Next, we argue that Descartes’ views on the nature of
our sensory systems entails that God is a deceiver. We then look at four
objections to this argument—three concerning whether we may in some way
be responsible for our false color judgments, not God, and one concerning
the unique kind of color judgments at play—arguing that these all fail. One
might wonder how the very idea of non-malicious divine deception in sensory
experience could get traction without at least assuming from the get-go that,
for Descartes, an omnibenevolent God deceiving us is a live option. But this
gets the dialectic backwards. The question is not how Descartes’ views about
God may or may not constrain his views about our sensory systems. The
question rather is what Descartes in fact says about our sensory systems;
and what he says, on our view, entails that God is a deceiver.
In view of this, one might just say that, even if our argument is sound,
Descartes was simply inconsistent, not realizing what his views about our
sensory system committed him to. That’s certainly plausible, and not an
option we attempt to rule out here. Instead, what we attempt to do is explore
whether Descartes could have allowed for divine deception, irrespective of
whether he actually did, and what this might look like. Without making any
claims about what Descartes definitively meant, we’ll suggest that Descartes
has the resources to allow for our ‘omni-compatible’ sense of divine deception,
while maintaining the integrity of his core arguments in the Meditations. As
Mersenne tells Descartes, various medieval philosophers allowed for divine
deception (Perler 2010); we suggest that Descartes can too.
4Sarah Patterson (2016) has also recognized that Sensory Deception is true through
a general analysis of sensory experience (although she does not focus on color), and that
Sensory Deception poses a problem for God’s non-deceptive nature. However, she
claims that Descartes does not have any viable solution to this problem. We do: Descartes
can admit that God is a (non-malicious) deceiver.
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2 Color Eliminativism and Deception
2.1 Color Eliminativism
Bodies—tables, grass, and national flags—look colored. We also think that,
absent the possibility of an illusion, bodies have the colors they look to have.
The color eliminativist—or simply ‘eliminativist’—says that this is wrong.
Bodies look colored. We have color sensations. But bodies are not colored.
Eliminativism is thus an error theory : color sensations misrepresent external
bodies as colored.5 And this is systematic. Color sensations are not just occa-
sionally non-veridical; they are systematically non-veridical by their nature.6
There are di↵erent versions of eliminativism—di↵ering, for instance, on
whether colors are uninstantiated, or just not instantiated where they appear
to be—but these details won’t matter. What matters is that Descartes was an
eliminativist of some stripe. And we will assume as much. This assumption is
well-founded. Eliminativism is part and parcel of the early modern philosoph-
ical ethos. Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Boyle, Malebranche, and Locke were
mechanists about bodies, making eliminativism all but a foregone conclusion
(cf. Chamberlain 2019a).7
5We’ll assume representationalism (Simmons 1999, De Rosa, 2007; Hatfield 2013), but
qualia realists (MacKenzie 1990) can grant eliminativism too.
6The eliminativist is concerned with our ordinary recognitional concept of color (Maund
2011)—sometimes called ‘colors-as-we-see-them’ (Mackie 1978), ‘phenomenal colors’ or
‘sensuous color’. Chamberlain (2019a: 294) uses ‘sensuous color’, defined as the property
that “material things visually appear to have when they appear to be colored.”
7See Principles II.4 ((AT VIIIA: 42/CSM I: 224). For a sampling of eliminativist read-
ings of Descartes see: Buroker (1991), Chamberlain (2019a), Cook (1996), Downing (2011),
Garber (1992: 75), Keating (2004), Maund (2011: 382), Rozemond (1999: 452-3). Indeed,
even readings that, on their surface, appear to cut against an eliminativist view, are in
fact eliminativist. For example, Cottingham (1989) argues that, according to Descartes,
bodies have dispositional colors. But this does not make Descartes a dispositionalist, be-
cause Cottingham (Ibid.: 238) denies that dispositional colors are colors; the eliminativist
will concur with this stance, but that’s not to say that she must deny that bodies have
dispositions to experientially a↵ect certain perceivers in certain contexts. Likewise, Ather-
ton (2004) argues that, according to Descartes, bodies have physical colors, but she also
denies (Ibid.: 33) that physical colors are colors; the eliminativist will concur with this
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Now Nolan (2011) argues that Descartes is a color nominalist. Color terms
don’t express properties of minds or bodies. This is compatible with elimina-
tivism, since the eliminativist can deny that colors exist at all, even as unin-
stantiated properties (Hardin 1988). Nolan also insists that color appearances
are not sensory or perceptual, but wholly due to habitual (false) judgments.
This too is compatible with eliminativism, but as it’s a point that will be
central in our argument to follow, it’s worth flagging now. Nolan’s motiva-
tions here are multi-faceted, but of note in the present context is his (2011:
98) insistence that letting anything but habitual judgments attribute colors
to bodies will tell against God’s non-deceptive nature. For if the misleading
color appearances are in part due to false judgments—habitual judgments
which are revisable—then God is o↵ the hook.
We’ll return to this issue in Section 2.2.2, but one point will su ce for now.
If these judgments are revisable, we can ask what happens when we revise
them. And once we ask that question, we get a plainly false prediction: once
the judgments are revised, bodies should no longer look colored. But that’s
not what happens. I can stop judging that a stop sign is red—perhaps because
I now believe that eliminativism is true—but this will have no bearing on how
the stop sign looks to me. It’s not as if once one becomes an eliminativist,
one no longer agrees with non-eliminativists about the appearances of things.
Surely Descartes would have recognized this.
So Nolan should allow that color appearances are sensory. This does not
mean that color appearances are not always accompanied by judgments; in-
deed, on our analysis of Descartes, they are. But these judgments are not
revisable. Nolan is right to worry about the implications of this claim for
God’s non-deceptive nature. And of course that’s exactly our point.
stance, but that’s not to say that she must deny that bodies token spectral reflectance
types (cf. Byrne & Hilbert 2003).
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2.2 God is a Deceiver
Descartes only o↵ers examples of deception (see, e.g., First Meditation, AT
VII: 18/CSM II: 12, Discourse I, AT VI: 9/CSM I: 115, Optics AT VI:
145/CSM I: 174). Even so, given his examples, Descartes would endorse:
DECEPTION: X deceives a subject, S, if (i) S judges that p; (ii) it’s
false that p; (iii) X judges that p is false; (iv) the evidence E on the basis
of which S judges that p is brought about by X for the purpose of making
S judge that p.
Deception captures a form of deception by commission.8,9 However, as
we will see, whether God is a deceiver under Deception will depend on
how ‘judge’ (and ‘judgment’) is understood. Thus Deception needs to be
unpacked thoroughly.
Our argument runs as follows:
D1 Bodies are not colored.
D2 In virtue of bodies looking colored—i.e. in virtue of the fact that
certain phenomenological evidence E obtains—the subject, S judges
that bodies are colored.
D3 So, in virtue of bodies looking colored—i.e. in virtue of the fact
that certain phenomenological evidence E obtains—S falsely judges
that bodies are colored. [D1-D2]
D4 God brought about E for the purpose of making S falsely judge
that bodies are colored.
D5 God knows that bodies are not colored.
D6 If D3, D4, and D5, God is a deceiver [given Deception].
8See Mahon (2016). Unlike ‘lie,’ ‘deceive’ is a success verb (Ryle 1949: 130).
9Dropping ‘for the purpose of’ from clause (iv) makes room for non-intentional forms
of deception (Chisholm & Feehan 1977). Everything to follow will apply on non-intentional
deception too, since (iv) entails its weaker non-intentional, purely causal cousin.
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) God is a deceiver.
D1 follows from eliminativism. D5 is an assumption. Since D3 is a bridge
conclusion, what remains to be discussed are D2, D4, and D6.
2.2.1 Regarding D2
D2 concerns sensory judgments. Broadly writ, a ‘sensory judgment’ refers to
a judgment about some sensory state of a↵airs. A sensory state of a↵airs can
concern just sensible qualities (for example, the redness of a rose), sensations
themselves, or both. Not all sensory judgments need to be immediately caused
by a sensation. I could, for instance, judge that roses are red based on my
memory of seeing a rose. However, in the Sixth Replies Descartes recognizes
a class of sensory judgments—one of three grades of ‘sensory response’—
that by their nature are immediately caused by sensations. The first grade
of sensory response is purely physiological and consists of the “immediate
stimulation of the bodily organs by external objects” and terminates in a
brain impression (AT VII: 436/CSM II: 294). The second-grade of sensory
response occurs in the mind, and comprises “all the immediate e↵ects pro-
duced in the mind as a result of its being united with a bodily organ which
is a↵ected in this way” (Ibid.). These are ‘sensations’ in our parlance. The
third-grade of sensory response involves cognitive processes, and “includes
all the judgments [judicia] about things outside us [de rebus extra nos ] which
we have been accustomed [consuevimus ] to make from our earliest years—
judgements which are occasioned by the movements of these bodily organs”
(AT VII: 437/CSM II: 294-5).
The operative word here is ‘occasioned’. Let third-grade judgments be
judgments about sensory states of a↵airs—specifically, sensible qualities—
that are immediately occasioned by events at the first and second-grade of
sensory response. We think third-grade judgments have two unique features.
First, they in some way structure how things look phenomenologically. Sec-
ond, they are irrevisable. Following Simmons (2003), we will refer to third-
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grade judgments as constructive judgments (‘c-judgments’) to emphasize this
first feature. So defined, not all sensory judgments are c-judgments. Some sen-
sory judgments might neither structure phenomenology nor be irrevisable.
These are reflective judgments (‘r-judgments’). The existence of r-judgments
should be uncontroversial, but c-judgments also have gained broad favor in
the secondary literature. Simmons (Ibid.), Hatfield (1986), and Patterson
(2016) all contend that Descartes countenanced c-judgments.10
Now D2 says that S judges that bodies are colored in virtue of bodies
looking colored (i.e. E). While we often do make r-judgments to this e↵ect,
the sense of judgment relevant to D2, and our case that God is a deceiver,
concerns c-judgments. D3 (that S falsely c-judges that bodies are colored) fol-
lows from D1 and D2. We will thus take up three claims: first, that Descartes
countenanced c-judgments; second, that c-judgments about color are false;
and third, following Patterson (pace Simmons) c-judgments are issued by the
will. A corollary of the third claim is that c-judgments, if not beliefs, are very
much belief-like.
Claim One . Let’s start by looking again at Descartes’ three grades of
sensory response, focusing on color. At the first grade, there is some prop-
erty in bodies—perhaps a dispositional property or the categorical basis of
this dispositional property—that leads to a brain impression that, in turn,
causes a color sensation. The sensation itself is the second-grade of sensory
response. It’s in virtue of this second-grade response that bodies look col-
ored. This is because sensations represent bodies as colored. That sensations
represent follows from Descartes’ general claim that all mental states have ob-
jective reality, that they are “of things [rerum]” (Third Meditation, AT VII:
44/CSM II: 30), and his more specific claim that sensations inform [signifi-
candum] (Sixth Meditation, AT VII: 83/CSM II: 57). Given eliminativism,
this implies that bodies are misrepresented as colored. So, again, when it
comes to D2, and its talk of ‘phenomenological evidence’, this concerns the
10When unqualified, ‘judgment’ can refer to a c-judgment or r-judgment.
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second-grade of sensory response; it’s the misrepresentation at the second-
grade that constitutes the phenomenological evidence (E) in virtue of which
S is deceived, if in fact S is deceived.
At the third-grade, the mind makes a host of judgments about what
occurs at the second-grade. The question is whether these judgments struc-
ture sensory phenomenology and are irrevisable—that is, whether there are
c-judgments so defined. Here, two points are especially germane:
(1) Third-grade judgments partially structure sensory phenomenology.
(2 If third-grade judgments partially structure sensory phenomenology,
then given Descartes’ views about the status and bio-functional role
of our God-given sensory system, we should expect that third-grade
judgments are also irrevisable.
If (1) and (2) hold, then third-grade judgments are c-judgments so defined.
Extensive arguments for (1) have been o↵ered by Simmons (2003), Hat-
field (1986), and Patterson (2016), so we’ll confine ourselves to two clarifica-
tory remarks. First, most of the examples of c-judgments adduced by Sim-
mons, Hatfield, and Patterson pertain to size, shape, and distance.11 However,
considerations of theoretical economy suggest that if Descartes countenanced
judgments that partially determine sensory phenomenology at all, then he
countenanced them for all properties represented at the second-grade, and
so colors too. Indeed, on the assumption that Descartes is talking about
11As just one example, in the Optics, Descartes first explores the idea that judgments
are involved in sensory phenomenology:
When we look at two ships out at sea, one smaller than the other but propor-
tionately nearer so that they appear equal in size, we can use the di↵erence
in their shapes and colours, and in the light they send to us, to judge which
is the more distance. (AT VI: 140/CSM I: 172)
A third-grade judgment about the distance between the ships—based on the shapes and
colors represented at the second-grade—in part determines the appearance of the ships’
distance. According to Simmons, “[t]hese judgments associate such things as brightness
with proximity, and dimness with distance, so that the brighter ship looks to be closer in
the resulting sensory experience” (2003: 572).
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such judgments in the aforementioned passage of the Sixth Replies, he makes
this point rather clearly, saying that these judgments include “all judgments
about things outside us.” And so, since color sensations concern things out-
side us (bodies), there will be judgments that structure the phenomenology
of color experience if there are such sensory judgments at all.
Second, we make no claims about how exactly these judgments structure
phenomenology. In the case of judgments about shape, Simmons tells us that:
When I look at a bagel from an oblique angle, I judge that it is
round (or perhaps toric) despite the elliptical patch of brown it
produces in my visual field at the second-grade of sensory percep-
tion; the result is a sensory experience in which the bagel looks
round (or toric). (2003: 554)
With color sensations, Simmons suggests that these judgments account for
color constancy amongst bodies, representing that particular bodies instanti-
ate a particular color across distinct illumination conditions (2003: 573). As
Simmons writes: “I may therefore judge, at the third-grade of sensory percep-
tion, that those leaves are green with the result that the leaves look like green
leaves in changing light” (Ibid.; emphasis added). We don’t know if Simmons
is right about this. Our claim is just that there are sensory judgments that
structure the phenomenology of sensory experience, and this includes sensory
experiences of color.
Regarding (2), to say that a third-grade judgment is irrevisable is to say
that one cannot cease the formation of a third-grade judgment, or alter its
content-type, once a second-grade sensation is had. To say that they are
revisable is to say otherwise. The case for (2) is broadly theoretical. The
case, inspired by Patterson (2016), goes like this. Descartes claims that our
sensory faculties—including all grades of sensory response—have a biological
function of preserving the health of mind-body composite. As such, it’s not
just the sensations at the second-grade that play this role, but third-grade
judgments as well. And critically, while both the second and third-grades
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work in concert to preserve our health, the way they do this will be di↵erent.
Whatever phenomenology-determining role third-grade judgments play—and
we know that they play some role, given point (1)—it’s that very role that
helps preserve our health. For example, if Simmons is right, the second-grade
makes bodies look colored simpliciter (something that is good for us), and
the third-grade makes bodies look to have the same color across di↵erent
illumination conditions (also good for us). More generally, if God gave us
the best of all possible sensory systems, then the way third-grade judgments
structure phenomenology must be perfectly suited towards our preservation.
In other words, the third-grade judgments we in fact issue have to be the best
of all possible such judgments, qua their bio-functional role. If God gave us
the best of all possible sensory systems, and such judgments are part of that
system and so figure into the preservation of our well-being, then any attempt
to revise them as fallible, finite beings would ipso facto make them worse.
Thus from a design standpoint, it makes more sense for these judgments to
be irrevisable. It’s no wonder then that they are considered automatic, and
caused directly by sensory states without any inference. Anything short of
this would, we presume, permit them to be revisable.12
So Descartes plausibly countenanced c-judgments—i.e. irrevisable sensory
judgments that partially structure phenomenology. Of course, if I wear color-
tinting glasses I ‘revise’ my sensations and c-judgments, but this is only at
a token level. With color-tinting glasses, my color sensations are of the same
type; they still represent bodies as colored. Likewise for my c-judgments; they
12Simmons take on irrevisability is di↵erent. For Simmons, c-judgments are an essential
constituent of sensory experience, and since sensory experiences are themselves irrevisable,
she concludes that third-grade judgments are irrevisable (2003: 578). We are not inclined
towards this line, since we think there is a good sense in which the second-grade constitutes
a sensory experience all on its own. Simmons reserves ‘sensory experience’ for the joint
product of the second-grade sensation and a c-judgment. We reject this usage. This is not
to deny that c-judgments have a unique role, as Simmons contends. Since on our view the
second-grade sensation is su cient for a body to look colored simpliciter, this strikes us as
good of a candidate as any for being a sensory experience. What we insist on is that there
is no further thing that results when second-grade sensations and c-judgments co-occur.
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are judgments which (in some way) represent bodies as colored. All color-
tinting glasses would do is change which color property is represented. At
the type level, revision is impossible. For if our sensory system really is the
best, any revision at that level would ipso facto make them worse.
R-judgments, by contrast, are revisable (Simmons 2004: 567-8; cf. Patter-
son 2016: 99). They are formed through inference. The meditator judges that
“the heat in a body is something exactly resembling the idea of heat which
is in me” (AT VII: 82/CSM II: 56). This judgment is revised—I can cease to
have it altogether—once the meditator learns that heat isn’t a property of
extension. R-judgments don’t structure sensory phenomenology, and so are
not part of our sensory system in the strict sense.13
Claim Two. Descartes and commentators are clear that all c-judgments
are false (Sixth Replies, AT VII: 437-439/CSM II: 295-6, Simmons 2003: 573-
4, Patterson 2016: 101). If that’s right, in the case of c-judgments about color,
their content can’t be that bodies merely look colored. They will at the very
least include the claim that bodies are colored. This claim is false, given
eliminativism. And since c-judgments are occasioned by color sensations, we
should expect robust similarity in content between the latter and the former.
So it’s no surprise that c-judgments have the false contents that they do.
Claim Three . For Simmons, r-judgments are not just di↵erent from c-
judgments because the former, but not the latter, are irrevisable. They are
also di↵erent because the latter are not beliefs, even if they often lead to
them (Simmons 2003: 567). A judgment is a belief only if it is issued by
the will. Since Simmons denies that c-judgments are issued by the will, she
claims they are not beliefs. Rather, they are a product of the intellect.
As to the source of c-judgments, Simmons is wrong. She realizes that
13This point of comparison between c-judgments and r-judgments roughly tracks the
distinction between ‘perceptual beliefs’ and ‘central beliefs’ familiar from contemporary
discussions of perceptual-belief formation and dual-component views of sensory experience
(e.g. Quilty-Dunn 2015). On the similarly “coercive”, “cognitively spontaneous” nature of
perceptual beliefs, see BonJour (1985: 117).
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her interpretation conflicts with Descartes’ standard theory of judgment in
the Fourth Meditation, according to which judgments are issued by the will
(2003: 565-6). Simmons supports this alternative reading by drawing from
Descartes’ claim in the Sixth Replies that “although such reasoning is com-
monly assigned to the senses (which is why I have here referred it to the
third-grade of sensory response), it’s clear that it depends solely on the intel-
lect [a solo intellectu pendere]” (Sixth Replies, AT VII: 437-8/CSM II: 295;
cf. Optics (AT VI: 137-8/CSM I: 170).
However, as Patterson rightly points out, Descartes’ use of ‘intellect’ in
this context is misleading:
I read Descartes’s talk of the intellect alone as designed to empha-
sise that the senses are not involved, rather than to exclude any
role for the will. This reading gains support from the fact that
Descartes associates judgments in the full-blooded sense with the
‘intellect alone’ at the end of the Second Meditation, where his
point is also to contrast judgment with the senses and imagina-
tion. . . Here Descartes uses ‘intellect’ as an umbrella term to cover
intellect and will, the faculties of pure mind, when a contrast is
being made with the faculties of the embodied mind. (2016: 85,
fn. 48)
Thus we’ll assume r-judgments and c-judgments are issued by the will.14
14This assumption might engender two worries, one concerning Descartes’ activity versus
passivity distinction, and one concerning freedom. On the former, Descartes’ claim that
sensations are wholly passive is consistent with c-judgments being issued by the will. This
prima facie inconsistency is in part due to Descartes’ slippery usage of ‘sensation’. As
evidenced by his clarifications in the Sixth Replies, he sometimes uses ‘sensation’ to refer
to the composite sensory experience that includes the third and second-grade of sensory
response, and sometimes he uses ‘sensation’ to refer to the second-grade alone (our usage).
Resolving the tension is straightforward: sensations at the second-grade are wholly passive.
On the latter, the worry is that if we cannot help but issue c-judgments, then the will
cannot be wholly free. While this matter is tricky, it’s fairly clear that Descartes recognizes
conditional constraints on the will. For instance, Ragland (2006) contends that Descartes
endorsed this claim: given certain conditions, if S has a clear and distinct perception that
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On the relationship between c-judgments and beliefs, if being issued by
the will were su cient for being a belief, then pace Simmons, c-judgments
would be beliefs. It will not be useful to adjudicate here what really counts
as a belief. So we will be agnostic on this su cient condition. That said, we
know that beliefs have propositional content, are assertoric in force, capable
of figuring in inferences, linguistically expressible in suitable creatures, and
possessive of a distinctive functional profile—that is, they interact in char-
acteristic ways with desires, emotions, action, and memory (Quilty-Dunn
2015: 559). C-judgments don’t obviously tick all of these boxes. For exam-
ple, Simmons (2003: 554 fn. 13) flirts with the idea that c-judgments are
at least confusedly presented to consciousness (Principles I.46, AT VIII-A
22), which might make them linguistically inexpressible. Yet as Quilty-Dunn
notes (2015: 559), given that beliefs are functional states, and so specified in
terms of roles they are disposed to fulfill, that c-judgments may not actually
fulfill these roles is otiose: “dispositions can be muted” (Ibid.).
The status of c-judgments as beliefs, then, is unsettled. And we are happy
to keep it at that. What we do insist on, however, is that c-judgments are
certainly ‘belief-like’; they are propositional and they have assertoric force,
and they are truth-apt. Following Cassam (2010: 83), judging that p is “the
act of occurrently putting p forward in one’s mind as true” (2010: 83). So
one can thus c-judge falsely, i.e. put p forward in one’s mind as true when
it isn’t. And (falsely) c-judging that p, if not requiring one to believe that p,
will at least dispose one to believe that p.
Going forward, then, the primary takeaways are two-fold. First: when it
comes to D3, and its talk of ‘false judgments’, this concerns c-judgments
not r-judgments. Second: c-judgments are issued by the will, are at least
F, S cannot refrain from judging that F (Fourth Meditation, AT VII: 58-9/CSM II: 41).
Yet this is structurally analogous to our claim about c-judgments: we only claim that if
S has a second-grade sensation, then S cannot refrain from issuing a c-judgment. And
as before, the reason has to do with optimal design: God deemed this set-up best for the
preservation of our health.
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belief-like, and are automatic and irrevisable. And as will become clear, the
existence of c-judgments is what renders Descartes’ God a deceiver. What is
deceptive are second-grade color sensations, but S is only deceived once she
makes false c-judgments.
2.2.2 Regarding D4
D2 claimed that S makes c-judgments to the e↵ect that bodies are colored
due to certain phenomenological evidence E—i.e. the phenomenological fact
that bodies look colored at the second-grade. D4 goes further. Adjusted for
subsequent clarifications, it says:
D4 God brought about E for the purpose of making S falsely c-judge
that bodies are colored.
D4 corresponds to clause (iv) of Deception. By ‘brought about’ we mean
that God is broadly causally responsible for the makeup of our sensory sys-
tem, which includes the way things look. We see three ways in which D4
might be false. Each objection targets clause (iv) by denying that God is
responsible for our deception, but they do so di↵erently. The first objection
trades on our finitude; God designed us and our sensory systems, but without
any intent per se to deceive us; bodies look colored because of a design glitch.
On the second objection, we ourselves generate the misleading evidence via
our habitual violations of epistemic norms. On the third objection, given
our violation of epistemic norms, while S does not generate the evidence, S
misunderstands what the second-grade is telling her. And it’s only because
of this misunderstanding that S is deceived; once the norm is followed, S
realizes that the second-grade isn’t misleading after all. The common thread
of these objections is that although S can be deceived, it’s not due to God.
Responding to these objections substantiates Sensory Deception.
Objection One . The first objection to D4 leverages the Sixth Meditation
response to the problem of dropsy (AT VII: 87-9/CSM II: 60-1). The thirst
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sensations S has when su↵ering from dropsy are both deceptive and harmful.
Descartes responds by noting that God’s intention in designing our system
was to give us the best of all possible sensations (Sixth Meditation, AT VII:
87-8/CSM II: 60). However, this optimal design is implemented in finite mind-
body composites. And finitude allows for glitches in our sensory system. An
aberrant motion in the body can cause a sensation that is harmful to us.
Such glitches are due to our finitude, not God’s design of our sensory system
(Sixth Meditation AT VII: 88-9/CSM II: 61). By extension, the thought then
is that color sensations misrepresent bodies as colored due to our finitude.
This objection fails. Unlike dropsy, color sensations are systematically
misleading. Dropsy is a rare or one-o↵ a↵air, explainable by our finitude
and the failure of proper correspondence between physiological stimulation,
brain impression, and sensation. By contrast, the error inherent to color
sensations leaves every impression of design; bananas standardly look yellow
(but are not), leaves standardly look green (but are not), and they all do so
in predictable circumstances.
This point is worth embellishing. In general, if I want to know what an
agent’s intentions were in creating some system, then I should examine how
it behaves under optimal conditions. Suppose you had a typewriter where,
every time you hit the ‘H’ key, a ‘P’ was printed on the page. The typewriter
is clearly not working correctly. Because of this, you shouldn’t infer at the
outset that the designer of the typewriter wanted you to spell ‘horses’ as
‘porses’ and ‘hats’ as ‘pats.’ There has been a mistake. Similarly, the fact
that dropsy rarely occurs, and only occurs when the body isn’t functioning
properly, tells against God’s bringing about dropsy so that S would drink.
We’ll return to this point later (Section 3.2), but the point for now is that
we have precisely the opposite situation in the case at hand: the systematic
illusoriness of color sensations is not a glitch. Things are working precisely
how they are supposed to be working. Our visual system is supposed to falsely
attribute color properties to bodies. It’s reasonable to infer, then, that it was
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a part of God’s design plan.
Objection Two. The second objection leverages the Fourth Meditation
account for how to avoid intellectual error:
TRUTH RULE: A subject, S, should not judge that p unless S is oc-
currently clearly and distinctly perceiving that p. (Third Meditation, AT
VII: 35/CSM II: 24; Fourth Meditation, AT VII: 60-1/CSM II: 41)
Since color sensations are not clear and distinct, when S a rms them she
violates the Truth Rule. I improperly use my will by extending it to that
which is obscure and confused. Therefore, the source of the error lies in us,
not God. So, God is not a deceiver.
The Truth Rule, as described in the Meditations, is restricted to r-
judgments. For the Truth Rule to have any teeth, it must apply to judg-
ments that we can revise or cease to have. So it cannot apply to c-judgments.
But it can still be apt, and relevant to D4, if appropriately supplemented.
The supplementation draws a connection between judgments we can revise—
i.e. r-judgments—and how bodies look at the second-grade. This is critical,
because even if we do violate the Truth Rule, we violate it because of the
misleading phenomenological evidence at the second-grade—evidence, that
has, on the face of it, nothing to do with us. Here is the combined principle:
FAULT: Bodies look colored only when S fails to exercise her will properly—
that is, when S r-judges in a way that violates the Truth Rule.
Fault says that when S judges in a way where she could have judged other-
wise, she creates the misleading appearance of bodies looking colored. Indeed,
as we saw, Nolan (2011: 98) endorses something like Fault in his attempt to
acquit God of deception. The idea is that the misleading phenomenological
evidence at the second-grade is somehow due to S in the first place.
This move is a non-starter. First, recall that there are principled reasons—
viz. that God gave us the best sensory system—that the second-grade is itself
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stable and irrevisable. This objection is predicated on such an assumption
being false, because it turns on S being in some sense able to correct the
type of sensations she has (e.g. sensations which predicate colors of bodies).
But suppose we suppress that assumption. The objection still fails. For
when we consider the relevant sense of ‘looks’, Fault is false; bodies still
look colored even when I correctly apply the Truth Rule. Compare:
(a) The book looks (seems) red to S.
(b) It looks (seems) to S like the kitchen was ransacked.
‘Looks’-statements (or ‘seems’-statements) are utterances of sentences like
(a) and (b). But the sense of looks in (a) is quite di↵erent from that in (b).
Sentence (a) employs a non-comparative phenomenal sense of ‘looks’, whereas
(b) employs an epistemic sense of ‘looks’ (Chisholm 1957; Jackson 1977).
When ‘look’ is used epistemically, the sentence conveys what is subjectively
probable, conditional on the evidence available. A mark of epistemic looks is
that they go away in the presence of a defeater if the agent is rational. So,
if you are rational, it will stop looking as if a hungry burglar ransacked your
kitchen once you see the paw prints and deduce that it was a raccoon.
That’s not so with when ‘look’ is used phenomenally. Recall (Section 2.1)
the discussion of Nolan’s nominalism. Even when S learns that she is su↵ering
an illusion, and that the book is really green, she will still sincerely utter (a).
This point is not limited to color. Consider the Müller-Lyer illusion:
Fig. 1: The Müller-Lyer Illusion
The second line does not stop looking longer than the first even when I know
that they are equal in length. But now notice: relevant for Fault is the
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phenomenal sense of ‘looks’—the sense in which bodies look phenomenally
colored. Thus, Fault is false, and in a way that anyone can see, Descartes
included. This is not like dualism.15
Objection Three . The third objection to D4 does not claim that S
generates E. Instead, it claims that, given S’s violation of another epistemic
norm, S misunderstands E ; S is wrong about the ‘claims’ sensations make
about the world. As such, insofar as S is deceived by sensations, the mistake
is on S, not God.
Simmons (1999) advocates something like this move. Whether a sensation
will give rise to a true or a false r-judgment depends on what S believes about
the function of the sensation. Given their biological function, the idea is that
sensations are not designed to guide us in metaphysical inquiry. As Descartes
says, “I misuse them [sensations] by treating them as reliable touchstones
[regulis certis ] for immediate judgments [immediate dignoscendum] about the
essential nature of the bodies located outside us” (Sixth Meditation, AT VII:
83/CSM II: 57-8). Or as Simmons puts it: “[w]hat is important here is that
the level at which sensations get their representational hook on the world
is the level of ecology not physics” (1999: 356). If S understands the proper
function of sensations, then sensations will guide S to making true judgments
about bodies in her environment. This is the sense in which sensations are
materially true for Simmons (1999: 363). However, if we misunderstand the
function of sensations—believing that they are accurate guides to the meta-
physics of res extensa—then we will make false r-judgments about bodies.
This is the sense in which sensations are materially false for Simmons (1999:
363; cf. Nelson 1997). In short, Simmons is providing another epistemic norm
that is supposed to guide our r-judgments:
15Müller-Lyer type cases—or known-illusions—are compatible with the present story
about c-judgments. When the subject denies that the book is red post-Meditations, she
is expressing her lack of endorsement for her c-judgment that says otherwise. This is not
surprising given the non-inferential nature of c-judgments, and our more general recogni-
tion of having cognitive states that we fail to endorse (Quilty-Dunn 2015). Issues related
to this point will become central in Section 2.2.3.
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FUNCTION RULE: S ought to clearly and distinctly perceive the essen-
tial biological function of a given sensation before making any r-judgments
based on that sensation.
Function Rule, as a species of the Truth Rule, is only intelligible if
it’s restricted to r-judgments. But presumably the idea is that when S r-
judges without heeding the Function Rule, S is apt to misinterpret what
the second-grade is telling her. If S were to follow the Function Rule
she would see that her sensations are actually materially true. Yes, perhaps
bodies don’t have colors. But our sensations don’t exactly say that bodies
have them either—at least not in any deep metaphysical sense. As such, since
S’s sensations, properly understood, are not deceptive to begin with, God
cannot be a deceiver in virtue of giving us those sensations.16
Two points. First, there is something obscure about the distinction Sim-
mons is tacitly drawing. Simmons claims that sensations have a “representa-
tional hook” on the world (1999: 356). For a sensation to represent, it must
make a ‘claim’ about the world. For Simmons, these claims are not metaphys-
ical but “ecological”. It’s not exactly clear what justifies this distinction. Of
course, we can recognize assertoric claims about the world that fail to have
metaphysical import. For example, we might imagine a person who, upon
looking at a bare cupboard, remarks that there is some empty space to place
a box. That claim does not in itself commit the speaker to any metaphysical
claims, since perhaps she does not include empty space in her ontology. Yet
this analogy distorts how color sensations work, and indeed how they must
work, given Descartes’ commitments about their function. Color sensations
plausibly have an attributive structure, and they have this structure because
it is by attributing color properties to bodies that we can navigate the world.
We can think of their content as being of the form <x is F>, where ‘x’ picks
out an external body and ‘F’ picks out some color property. To say that noth-
16Simmons (1999) employed this move before her introduction of c-judgments (2003).
Our guess is that she would now reject D6. We address this objection next in Section 2.2.3
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ing is colored is to say that there is no x that falls under the extension of F.
But absent the quite rare cases where S is undergoing a total hallucination,
there always will be some x.
In this way, color sensations on eliminativism are best thought of as sys-
temic illusions, and it is a conceptual truth that, in illusions, we are aware
of an existent object that is at variance with how it looks to be. This point
is absolutely crucial, for in the empty space case, ex hypothesis, there is no
object to which we are attributing a property. Given the person’s ontological
commitments, there is nothing. Yet that’s not so in the color case. And that
is really all that matters for color sensation’s making metaphysical claims.
In attributing a property to an object, we are considering what that object
is like. That, in some good sense of the term, is a metaphysical claim. This
may not be a claim about what the object is like essentially, but not all
metaphysical claims are claims about essential properties, and the same goes
for Descartes’ system (they can be about modes). And the property may also
only be relational—a property bodies have “relative to us and to our con-
tinued well-being” (Ibid., p. 356). Yet this too is metaphysical, since saying
what bodies are like relative to us is still saying what bodies are like.
So by the mere fact that sensations represent bodies, they will in doing so
make some sort of metaphysical claim about bodies. The deeper, second point
following from this, though, is that when we consider how color sensations
preserve our health, we see that these metaphysical claims are false. Whether
or not bodies are colored, we have sensations as of colored bodies. As with
all sensations, color sensations have the bio-functional role of preserving the
health of the mind-body composite. And there can be no doubt that essen-
tial to realizing this function is their representing bodies so that they look
colored. Consider that a primary function of color vision is the recognition
of food sources, like ripe fruit. It’s at best di cult to see how S could rec-
ognize a ripe banana without representing it as yellow—a claim about what
bananas are like. Once this point is recognized, however, and we consider it
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in light of Descartes’ eliminativism, Simmons’ position becomes untenable.
For notice: if an essential feature of the biological function of color sensa-
tions is the representation of bodies as colored, then any r-judgment made
about bodies in our environment when considering color sensations qua their
essential bio-functional role will at least include the claim that bodies are col-
ored. However, if color sensations were materially true, then, presuming the
Function Rule, any such r-judgment will be true. Yet given eliminativism,
the claim that bodies are colored will not be true. Therefore, no r-judgment
made about bodies when considering color sensations qua their essential bio-
functional role will be true. In other words, color sensations are materially
false. So S is not mistaken about E. D4 is safe.
Perhaps one might challenge the idea that these r-judgments will include
the claim that bodies are colored. Alas, doing so in an ad-hoc manner is likely
hopeless. Consider the r-judgment yellow bananas are ripe. That’s true. But
aside from the fact that it’s not clear how to connect such an r-judgment
in the appropriate way with our color sensations—after all, it’s hardly clear
that sensations themselves attribute ripeness to bananas—a response here
cannot not simply say that, in accordance with the Function Rule, S
makes true r-judgments to the e↵ect that bananas are ripe.17 It would also
have to say that, in accordance with the Function Rule, S does not and
cannot make false r-judgments to the e↵ect that bananas are yellow. The
problem though is that if the representation of bodies as colored is essential
to the function of color sensations, the would-be proponent of this move would
simply be stipulating that r-judgments to the e↵ect that bananas are yellow
are barred. The Function Rule considered on its own terms provides us
with no underlying reason for why this should be so.
17Whether sensations (strictly at the second-grade) represent the ripe banana as ripe is
highly contentious, since it’s doubtful that our visual system proper is even in the business
of representing anything beyond ‘low-level’ properties (size, shape, color, distance). See
Hawley & Macpherson (2011).
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2.2.3 Regarding D6
Recall D6: if D3, D4, and D5, God is a deceiver. It might seem like D6
isn’t in need of any defense. D5 states that God knows that bodies are not
colored. D3 states that S falsely c-judges that bodies are colored in virtue of
certain phenomenological evidence E, viz. that bodies look colored. And D4,
as we have just examined, says that God brought about E for the purpose of
making us falsely c-judge that bodies are colored. As such, D6 follows given
the definition of Deception. This is the line Patterson (2016: 98) takes,
emphasizing as she does that if God gave us a natural propensity to make
false c-judgments, then God’s being a deceiver is a genuine problem. Yet
this inference can be blocked by arguing that Deception is only a su cient
condition for deception if its use of ‘judgment’ concerns r-judgments. And
since r-judgments are revisable and governed by epistemic norms like the
Truth and Function Rules—rules S flouts—God is o↵ the hook. If all
goes well post-Meditations, then S no longer r-judges that bodies are colored.
The objection can be fleshed out by considering again how the Truth
and Function Rule were employed in the discussion of D4. There, the
former was used—supplemented by Fault—to examine how E might be
self-manufactured, while the latter was used to show how we might somehow
be mistaken about E. But suppose instead we grant that God did bring about
E and that E is deceptive—i.e. suppose that bodies look colored despite not
being so, and not because of us. Notice that one could grant this while denying
that God brought about E for the purpose of us making false judgments.
This would not work if we meant c-judgments, since we will always make
c-judgments come what may, and given eliminativism, they will always be
false. So this cannot be an objection to D4 per se. In this way, on the intended
reading, the objector can grant that D4 is true. However, if she insists that it’s
only r-judgments that matter for deception, then the Truth and Function
Rules can be re-envisioned simply as guides for what r-judgments God did
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intend for S to form, irrespective of what S c-judges.18 So while D4 is true
for c-judgments, it does not follow that God is a deceiver. Thus D6 is false.
In response, it’s unclear why letting ‘judgment’ refer to c-judgments would
render Deception false. If the idea is that c-judgments are not beliefs, our
answer is straightforward: c-judgments are belief-like enough. As we have
emphasized, c-judgments are issued by the will, and semantically evaluable
as true and false; indeed, a judgment that p—whether a r-judgment or c-
judgment—will always involve putting p before one’s mind as true. If the
idea is that c-judgments, at best, show that the sensory system is deceived
and not S, then this worry is blocked by the fact that c-judgments are issued
by the will—an active, not passive part of the mind-body composite. Thus
c-judgments seem perfectly apt to figure into an account of deception.
However, there is certainly something curious happening post-Meditations,
and perhaps this is what gives rise to suspicions about D6. To make things
concrete, consider a subject, S, who has yet to read the Meditations. S has
all sorts of false r-judgments: these are the r-judgments that are involved in
central planning and conscious inference. Amongst these false r-judgments
will be that bodies are colored. Like all r-judgments, this is formed from S’s
epistemic habits, and God cannot be impugned by them. But then S reads
theMeditations. S will no longer r-judge that bodies are colored, assuming all
goes well. And this will impact S’s behavior. If you ask S whether bananas
are yellow, or whether S would bet a large sum of money that the color of
healthy grass is green, S would say ‘no’. So the worry is that, given S’s new
cognitive and behavioral profile, it seems as if S is now not deceived about
bodies being colored, false c-judgments notwithstanding. R-judgments take
18Pre-Meditations, our r-judgments about color are false. Strictly speaking, more than
the Truth and Function Rules are needed to show that God is not a deceiver pre-
Meditations, however. We also need to assume that deception must be intentional. For
if there could be deception without an intent to deceive—a matter that is actually con-
tentious, recall fn. 9—one could simply say that we are deceived by God with respect to
our r-judgments because we falsely r-judge due to E, even though God only intended for us
to form true r-judgments, something we would have known once we read the Meditations.
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priority when assessing the epistemic status of an agent. And you simply
cannot be deceived while believing (or r-judging) the truth.
But you can. Take implicit bias. Subjects profess to not have a correspond-
ing explicit belief that p, despite there being evidence that they have the
relevant implicit attitude. Likewise, post-Meditations, S will explicitly deny
that bodies are colored, even though her will issues a claim (a c-judgment)
to the e↵ect that they are, and even though this issuance is irrevisable.
Now it’s often thought that implicit bias is caused by some associative
process/associative structure. This is usually glossed as some type of eval-
uative association, such as an association between a valence (e.g., negative
a↵ect) and a concept (e.g. BLACK MALE). Eric Mandelbaum (2016) calls
this thesis associative implicit bias (‘AIB’), and convincingly argues that AIB
is false. In its place, he proposes The Structured Belief hypothesis. Here, im-
plicit bias is underwritten by unconscious beliefs. These beliefs are not mere
associations. They are propositionally structured mental representations to
which S bears the belief relation. So instead of maintaining, to use Mandel-
baum’s example, that implicit racists merely associate (say) BLACK MALE
and DANGEROUS, the hypothesis is that implicit racists have a belief with
the structure BLACK MALES ARE DANGEROUS.
Suppose then that one forms the unconscious belief that black males are
dangerous via deceptive means. When asked, you don’t endorse this belief.
Yet you repeatedly act in ways that suggest you believe this. For example,
when on a subway and a black male sits next to you, you instinctively move
away. When you are walking to your car at night, and you see a black male
behind you, you quicken your pace. Such examples are emblematic of the
behavioral patterns of those who exhibit implicit racial biases. The upshot is
that one’s behavior is not merely a function of what one expressly avows, or
what one consciously believes.
Whatever c-judgments are—either full-blown beliefs with muted dispo-
sitions or belief-like judgments—they are not mere associations. We can
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thus substitute Mandelbaum’s implicit beliefs with Descartes’ will-issued c-
judgments, and consider our subject once again. S’s false c-judgment is made
automatically and is at least confusedly presented to consciousness (Sim-
mons 2003: 554 fn. 13)—much like the implicit racist who unconsciously, and
falsely, believes that black males are dangerous. Upon reading the Medita-
tions, S does not simply no longer endorse these judgments. S endorses elim-
inativism and so believes that bodies are not colored. And this belief is true.
Hence S at once c-judges (without endorsing) that p, while r-judging that
¬p, much like classic cases of implicit bias.19 Of course, the implicit racist’s
unconscious belief need not be formed via deceptive means. But they can
be, and when they are, we have no trouble saying the implicit racist was de-
ceived irrespective of what he or she expressly avows. Her behavior—moving
seats on the subway—is then in turn also the by-product of deceptive infor-
mation. Likewise, S’s c-judgment is occasioned by misrepresentation at the
second-grade, and will show up in her behavior, e.g. in how she treats bodies
as having the same color across di↵erent illumination conditions (supposing
we go with Simmons’ story about color constancy). And this all holds irre-
spective of whether S’s r-judgments are true. As such, the requirement that
Deception can only be cashed out in terms of r-judgments is too strong.
3 Don’t Panic
We have argued that Descartes’ God is a deceiver. This may induce panic in
the reader. On the face of it, this is a very problematic thesis to attribute to
Descartes, for it seems to reveal that Descartes is inconsistent and perhaps
19Implicit bias need not be a case of having an unconscious belief that p while refraining
from consciously endorsing p; it can also be a case of unconsciously believing that p while
consciously believing that ¬p. Bendana and Mandelbaum (forthcoming) call the latter
belief fragmentation. This allows for inconsistent information to be selectively accessed
such that there is no “interfragment consistency”—that is, no fragment (roughly, a data
structure) stores both p and ¬p at once (Ibid.). We contend that post-Meditations the
subject is su↵ering from something like belief fragmentation.
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deeply confused. While we think that we have shown that Descartes’ God
is a deceiver, regardless of texts that say otherwise, the question before us
is whether there is a way for Descartes to accept this conclusion on his own
terms. Patterson (2016: 100-102) claims that Descartes cannot.20 Although
we admit that there are no texts where Descartes unambiguously addresses
the problem before us, we think that Descartes o↵ers the resources for a so-
lution where we can understand in what sense God can be a deceiver without
upending his philosophical system. As such, there is ultimately no reason to
panic. The solution isn’t a sensory theodicy by which one tries to explain
away the deception. Rather, Descartes has within reach a sensory theodicy
in which he can bite the bullet: sensations are deceptive and God is a deceiver
on their account, albeit not problematically so.
This task may seem impossible, for there are too many passages where
Descartes straightforwardly claims that God cannot be a deceiver. We cannot
examine all of these passages here. But consider this paradigmatic one:
It is impossible [non posse] that God should ever deceive me [me
unquam fallat ]. For in every case of trickery or deception [fallacia
vel deception] some imperfection is to be found; and although
the ability to deceive appears to be an indication of cleverness
or power, the will to deceive is undoubtedly evidence of malice or
weakness [malitiam vel imbecillitatem], and so cannot apply to
God. (Fourth Meditation, AT VII: 53/CSM II: 37; cf. Principles
I.29, AT VIIIA:16/CSM I: 203; emphasis added).
Here, Descartes claims that every form of deception is incompatible with
God’s perfect nature. Why is that the case? The reasoning in this passage
20Patterson denies the viability of any Malebranchean solution that says “it is fine for
the senses to dispose us to false judgements. . . since the senses aim at survival rather than
truth” (2016: 101). Patterson contends that Descartes can’t go in for this line because he
nowhere claims that false c-judgments are designed to preserve our health (Ibid. 105). We
disagree: the point isn’t that being false per se is relevant for health-preservation, but that
it’s no bar for health-preservation.
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(and similar passages) runs as follows. Call this the incompatibility argument :
I1 Every form of deception involves malice (one kind of imperfection)
or weakness (another kind of imperfection).
I2 Malice is incompatible with God’s benevolence (a divine perfection).
I3 Weakness is incompatible with God’s omnipotence (a divine perfec-
tion).
) God cannot be a deceiver.
While premises (I2) and (I3) are implicit in the above passage, the Incom-
patibility Argument, or something very much like it, represents the central
theoretical grounds for denying that God is a deceiver.
However, we do argue that the Incompatibility Argument, and the pas-
sages that bear it out, do not tell the entire story about Descartes’ views on
divine deception. Take (I1). To deny (I1), Descartes would have to allow for:
OMNI-COMPATIBLE DECEPTION: God’s  ’ing is an act of omni-
compatible deception if God’s  ’ing is an act of deception that (i) does
not involve malice (incompatible with omnibenevolence) and (ii) does
not involve weakness (incompatible with omnipotence).21
We think Descartes can allow for omni-compatible deception, and indeed
there are passages, if only glimmers, that point precisely this way. We’ll fo-
cus mostly on clause (i), given that these passages only explicitly reference
malice, and because it’s not obvious what Descartes means by ‘weakness’ here
anyway. On at least one immediately plausible reading, “malice or weakness”
expresses not a true disjunction, but close synonyms. This would make weak-
ness something like moral weakness, which is functionally equivalent to mal-
ice, thus rendering (I3) and clause (ii) in Omni-compatible Deception
21We set aside features that are incompatible with omniscience, as Descartes does not
mention anything related to omniscience in the Fourth Meditation passage above.
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superfluous. However, to play it safe, we have tied weakness to omnipotence,
with the idea being that surely God could have achieved his ends (whatever
they are) in some other way that did not involve deception.22 So we’ll have
something else to say about this take on weakness as well.
Some will insist that these passages are anomalous, and so worth lit-
tle weight. But with the arguments of the preceding section, there is now a
meta-interpretive pressure to look at these passages anew. At a first-order in-
terpretive level—looking at these passages independently from our argument
from Sensory Deception—such a dismissal is more warranted, especially
in light of Descartes’ denials of God’s deceptive nature elsewhere. However,
when these passages are read against the background of our argument, we
now have new reasons (e.g. those driving from consistency) to take otherwise
obscure passages more seriously.
We proceed in three steps. First, we examine the passages where Descartes
discusses the possibility of omni-compatible deception. Second, we turn to
maliciousness, and consider the following two questions: (1) is God mali-
cious in giving S deceptive second-grade color sensations? And (2): Is God
malicious in making it such that S cannot help but issue false c-judgments
in response to the second-grade? We’ll argue that the answer to both is no.
These ‘no’ answers will also allow us to ask why God deceives us, which speaks
to the question of whether this form of deception implies weakness and thus
is at odds with God’s omnipotence. Finally, we argue that omni-compatible
deception does not upend other aspects of Descartes’ system.
3.1 Descartes on Omni-Compatible Deception
There are two main texts where Descartes acknowledges the possibility of
divine deception. First, in Objections and Replies II Mersenne writes:
You say that God cannot lie or deceive. Yet there are some school-
22Still impressionistically: the thought is that if someone is clever and powerful enough,
they would not need to use deception to get what they want.
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men who say he can. Gabriel...and Ariminensis among others,
think that in the absolute sense God does lie [mentiri ], that is,
communicate to men things which are opposed to his intentions
and decrees. Thus he unconditionally said to the people of Nin-
eveh, through the prophet, ‘Yet Forty days and Nineveh shall be
destroyed.’ And he said many other things which certainly did not
occur, because he did not mean his words to correspond to his in-
tentions or decrees...Cannot God treat men as a doctor treats the
sick, or a father his children? In both these cases there is frequent
deception [saepe decipiunt ] though it is always employed benefi-
cially and with wisdom [sapientur & cum utilitate]. For if God
were to show us the pure truth, what eye, what mental vision,
could endure it? (AT VII: 125-6/CSM II: 90).23
In pointing out false texts in scripture that may lead to false judgments,
Mersenne is pressing on Descartes’ seemingly unrestricted contention that
God cannot be a deceiver. Mersenne o↵ers the doctor-patient example to
help explain how deception could be permissible for God. A doctor might
say something false to a patient about their sickness with the intent of help-
ing them. But this isn’t obviously problematic. Similarly, there might be
falsities in scripture that are beneficial for believers. Perhaps then such cases
of deception would be permissible for God because it doesn’t conflict with
his benevolence. Now notice how Descartes responds:
I would not want to criticize [nolim tamen reprehendere] those
who allow that through the mouths of the prophets God can
produce verbal untruths which, like the lies of doctors who de-
ceive their patients in order to cure them, are free of any mali-
cious intent to deceive [desit omnis malitia deceptionis ]. (AT VII:
23Note that mentiri is translated by Cottingham et. al. as “lie.” But a more suitable
translation is “deceive” given the broader context of this passage. For a discussion of the
medieval accounts of deception referred to here, see Perler (2010).
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143/CSM II: 102).
While Descartes does not explicitly endorse non-malicious deception, that
he claims that he will not criticize the possibility of the doctor-patient case
suggests an implicit endorsement. Throughout the Objections and Replies,
Descartes is quite happy to point out when his interlocutors fall into contra-
dictory positions. If it were in fact contradictory for God to deceive full stop,
then Descartes would presumably point that out. One part of his response is
particularly telling: he claims that doctors can deceive without having “any
malicious intent to deceive.” This stands as a qualification to (I1).
Second, Hobbes raises the same query:
The standard view is that doctors are not at fault if they deceive
their patients for their health’s sake, and that fathers are not at
fault if they deceive their children for their own good. For the
crime of deception consists not in the falsity of what is said but
in the harm [injuria] done by the deceiver. (Objections III, AT
VII: 195/CSM II: 136)
Descartes reponds like this:
[I don’t] require that we can in no case be deceived (indeed, I
have readily admitted that we are often deceived). All that I
require is that we are not deceived in cases where our going wrong
[noster error ] would suggest an intention to deceive on the part
of God [voluntatem in Deo testaretur ]; for it is self-contradictory
that God should have such an intention. (Third Replies, AT VII:
195/CSM II: 136-7)
This response is especially interesting, if only because Descartes doesn’t an-
swer Hobbe’s question. The doctor’s main intention is to aid the patient; the
deception is a means to that end. So, again, we wonder: if this were something
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Descartes wanted to definitively rule out, why did he not say so?24
Descartes is cagey in these two texts. He is of course well-aware of all the
places where he claims that God cannot be a deceiver, and the foundational
role that this claim plays in his metaphysics and epistemology. Descartes
might have feared, then, that he would upend his entire system, and thus did
not want to make a full-blown concession to Mersenne and Hobbes. Yet our
contention is that Descartes failed to realize two crucial things: first, that his
prior commitments concerning the structure of our sensory systems commits
him to God being a deceiver in some sense, and second, that in fact he can
admit this without wreaking havoc on his philosophical system.
Suspending judgment regarding whether this is what Descartes actually
believed or meant, here is our suggestion for what Descartes could—and
indeed in light of our preceding argument from Sensory Deception—
should have meant: some acts of deception are not malicious. That is, they
are not meant to, nor cause, harm. And thus such acts of deception are
omni-compatible insofar as they are compatible with God’s benevolence.
Equating non-maliciousness with non-harmfulness is sensible given the
standard meaning of ‘malice’ but also Hobbes’ point that the “crime of de-
ception consists...in [its] harm.” Harm [nociturus ] is often bodily, as is the
case in Descartes’ Sixth Meditation discussion of dropsy (AT VII: 85/CSM
II: 59). But other harms are non-bodily. In the case of the evil deceiver of
the First Meditation, the harm is plausibly psychological (AT VII: 23/CSM
I: 15). This is evidenced by the kinds of passions—such as dread and fear—
expressed by the meditator when she considers the possibility that she could
be deceived about all matters (see Section 3.3.3).
Now there are two components of deception that are relevant for present
24Other commentators have read Descartes as conceding to Hobbes the possibility
of omni-compatible deception. For example, Robinson writes: “According to Descartes,
Mersenne and Hobbes are right; there are cases of morally acceptable deception. When,
in the Meditations, Descartes says that it is impossible for God to deceive, we should not
understand him as maintaining that God cannot deceive simpliciter. Rather, he should be
understood as claiming only that God cannot deceive maliciously” (2013: 522).
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concerns. First, there are the deceptive appearances at the second-grade, i.e.
sensory evidence E. Second, there are the false c-judgments that we issue in
response to E. Let God be a malicious deceiver i↵ either of these components
harms the subject who is deceived. So, the question we must now answer is
this: is the deception inherent in our sensory systems malicious?
3.2 Benefit and Harm in Sensory Systems
Ascertaining whether God’s designing of E makes him malicious can be clar-
ified by considering the following two claims:
BIOLOGICAL FUNCTION: The biological function of sensations is to
preserve the health of the mind-body composite. (Sixth Meditation, AT
VII: 83/CSM II: 57)
BEST SENSATIONS: God gave us the best of all possible sensations.
(Sixth Mediation, AT VII: 87-8/CSM II: 60)
The conjunction of Biological Function and Best Sensations implies
that God gave us the best sensations qua their functional role—“the one
sensation which, of all possible sensations [ex omnibus quos inferre potest ],
is most especially and most frequently conducive to the preservation of the
healthy man” (Sixth Meditation, AT VII: 87-8/CSM II: 60). So the tighter
gloss on the current question is this: assuming God would be malicious if
he gave us anything less than the best of all possible sensations, is the con-
junction of Biological Function and Best Sensations compatible with
God giving us systematically misleading color sensations?
In response, we won’t defend the claim that the misleading nature of color
sensations somehow makes them ‘the best’ qua their aiding us in (doing things
like) finding food sources. To maintain compatibility, color sensations being
misleading simply need be no bar to their optimally playing this sort of role.
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When asked how our various sensations could play their part in the preser-
vation of the mind-body composite, whether they misrepresent is irrelevant.
What matters is reliability. Mendelovici (2013) points out that a test can fail
to be valid while still being reliable. For example, the SAT may fail to be
valid insofar as it fails to detect what it’s intended to detect—e.g. predicting
success in college (Ibid.: 422). Still, it could be reliable insofar it tends to yield
the same results in di↵erent contexts. Similarly, while some representations
might be veridical and reliable, others may not. Our interest is in those that
reliably misrepresent : reliable, in that they respond similarly in similar cir-
cumstances; and non-veridical, since the world does not have the properties
they represent it to have. We want, as Mendelovici puts it, a representation
that “[gets] things wrong in the same way all the time” (Ibid.: 423).
Color sensations are reliable misrepresentations. They are illusory, but in
a systematic and reliable way. Paraphrasing somewhat, Mendelovici (Ibid.:
423) tells us that, for any (indicative) mental representation R and any prop-
erty F, R reliably misrepresents F i↵ : (i) R represents objects as having F;
(ii)]Most or all of the relevant objects don’t have F; and (iii) Tokens of R do
or would non-veridically represent objects as having F in the same types of
circumstances on separate occasions. These conditions are su cient to rec-
oncile God’s designing us to have systematically misleading color sensations
with Biological Function and Best Sensations, and thus compatible
with God being a non-malicious deceiver. Here’s why. Suppose S only wants
to identify ripe bananas. Ripe bananas look yellow. By eliminativism, they
are not yellow. So, when S sees bananas, she represents them as having a
property they don’t have. But that’s not a problem insofar as finding food
goes. What would be a problem is if S’s sensation represented the banana as
yellow in context C, green in context C*, magenta in C**, and so on, where
C, C*, and C** are all tokens of the same context-type. In all contexts, S’s
sensation would misrepresent. But it wouldn’t be doing so in a reliable man-
ner. And that would prevent S from finding food in an optimal manner, since
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it would sever the connection between being ripe and looking yellow.
Considerations that hold at the second-grade can be extended to the
third-grade. C-judgments are part of our sensory system, whose function is
the preservation of our health. Just as the non-veridicality of color sensations
is irrelevant on this score, the falsity of c-judgments is too. What matters is
the properties they represent bodies as having, and how they do this.
That said, in the Fourth Meditation, Descartes tells us that false judg-
ments are a privation, and that God cannot be causally responsible for any
privation (AT VII: 54-5/CSM II: 38). A privation is the lack of a perfection
that a substance ought to have (Ibid.). In this way, privations are malicious,
because if a substance lacks a perfection that it ought to have, it’s harmed.
Thus perhaps a further worry remains.
One move invokes the standard Cartesian response: the source of the
privation of false judgments is S, not God, because S forms false judgments
through a misuse of the will, and can avoid these false judgments by adhering
to epistemic norms like the Truth Rule. But of course, as we have argued,
that won’t work here; at the third-grade of sensory response, S cannot help
but form false c-judgments, and there are no epistemic norms that could get
S out of these false c-judgments. This would seem to make God causally
responsible for c-judgments, and therefore malicious.
Yet the worry trades on the assumption that false c-judgments are a
privation to begin with. We reject this. False c-judgments are not detrimental
to the health of the mind-body composite. Yet since a false c-judgment would
be a privation only if tokening that false c-judgment would be detrimental
to our health, it follows that false c-judgments are not privations.
This necessary condition on ‘privation-hood’ is motivated by two points.
First, Descartes’ claim about privations in the Fourth Meditation needs to
be indexed to the epistemic and metaphysical progress the meditator has
made with respect to her understanding of her self. By the Fourth Medita-
tion, the meditator understands herself solely as a thinking thing, and in the
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context of that meditation, the task is to establish the standards for scientia.
However, by the Sixth Meditation, the body also belongs to S, in some sense
(Chamberlain 2019b). S’s sense of self has expanded, thus our understanding
of a privation, in the context of the mind-body composite—ought to shift as
well. Given that S has a body whose health must be preserved, a sensory
privation in this context is just a sensory response that is harmful to the
mind-body composite. And it turns out that false c-judgments are a sensory
response that is beneficial. Therefore, they are not a privation.
Now notice: in the current story, deception per se need not be beneficial.
In the patient-doctor example, what is benefiting the patient is the doctor’s
speech act—her utterance of ‘you are going to get better.’ That claim might
be false, and the doctor might know it. Since the doctor wants her patient
to believe that she will get better, the doctor deceives her patient. Still, the
speech act isn’t beneficial in virtue of the statement it expresses being false.
After all, the speech act would still be beneficial even if it were true. When
a doctor says to a patient ‘you are going to get better,’ the reason this helps
(or so we are told) is that it aids the patient psychologically. These e↵ects
would still result even if it were true that the patient was going to get better.
(Maybe the doctor was right to say this even though she didn’t know it.)
Similarly, color sensations are not beneficial in virtue of being deceptive, but
in virtue of the way they attribute colors to bodies. They are deceptive, as
bodies don’t have colors. The deception is simply non-malicious.
This point does, however, harken back to the weakness component of
Omni-compatible Deception. For now we are left wondering why God
deceives us, even if only non-maliciously? If deception per se isn’t beneficial
as just conceded, it’s natural to wonder why God didn’t simply make bodies
colored, and let us reap the benefit anyway. That might strike some as a sign
of weakness, which is certainly not a concession Descartes can make.
The cogency of this question assumes that God could have made color a
property of res extensa without making color sensations any less beneficial.
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Yet this assumption is false. There is no sense in which God ‘could’ have cre-
ated a world in which bodies were colored because Descartes does not, like
Leibniz, have a modal metaphysics. Descartes’ metaphysics of God rules out
any substantive sense of possible worlds and unactualized possibilities (Nel-
son & Cunning 1999). God is deeply metaphysically simple: His attributes are
identical to each other (Principles I.23 AT VIIIA: 12-4/CSM I: 200-1). Most
relevant for present purposes, if God’s intellect and will are identical, this
implies that God’s thinking is identical to his creating. If there were unactu-
alized possible worlds in Descartes’ metaphysics, they would have to exist in
God’s intellect. However, the identification of intellect and will implies that
God creates whatever he considers (Ibid.: 139).
In addition, this assumption presupposes a backwards explanatory order:
that we can theorize about the nature of our sensory systems independent
from what bodies are actually like. This too is false. Descartes’ metaphysics
here is world first. Since disembodied souls don’t sense anything—they have
pure intellection—the very question of the nature of sensation, and what kind
of sensory system would be best, becomes live only once souls are embodied,
and put into an environment occupied by other bodies. Moreover, what kind
of sensory system would be best is fixed by the nature of that environment,
given what Descartes says about the function of sensations. So the question
‘why is the nature of bodies such-and-such?’ is prior to the question ‘why
do we have such-and-such sensations?’. The latter arises only once answers
to the former are fixed. This suggests a methodology when thinking about
the nature of our mental lives qua embodied beings, viz. that we must seek
explanations against background assumptions concerning the nature of res
extensa (cf. Carriero 2009: 423). If this is correct, and one concurs that
bodies are not colored, then all we need to do is ask what would be better:
a sensory system that represents bodies as colored (and is thus deceptive) or
one that doesn’t (and thus isn’t deceptive, at least in that respect). Clearly
the answer is the former. Sensory deception is thus compatible with God’s
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being all-powerful, and thus is omni-compatible on that count.
3.3 Systematic Concerns
The veridicality of clear and distinct perceptions, the resolution of the dream
doubt, and the proof of the external world rely on some anti-deception
premise. Yet all that’s needed is an anti-malicious deception premise.
3.3.1 The Veridicality of Clear and Distinct Perceptions
A foundational claim of the Meditations is that clear and distinct percep-
tions are veridical because God is not a deceiver. Could God non-maliciously
deceive us about clear and distinct perceptions?
No. If God were to deceive S about her clear and distinct perceptions,
this would be malicious deception, which is exactly why Descartes says that
it’s inconsistent with God’s nature for him to deceive us about our clear and
distinct perceptions. One reason intellectual deception would be malicious
is that it would prevent S from attaining virtue and ultimately happiness.
And for God to prevent S from attaining happiness would be to harm her.
For Descartes, genuine happiness—namely, the supreme satisfaction or con-
tentment of mind—results from being virtuous (see, e.g., Letter to Queen
Christina 20 Nov. 1647, AT V: 83/CSMK: 325). Cartesian virtue consists
in the firm and constant resolution to use the will well. Here, using the will
well consists in practically judging and acting according to knowledge of the
truth (Letter to Princess Elizabeth 15 Sept. 1645, AT IV: 291/CSMK: 266).
Knowledge of the truth is a necessary (but not su cient) condition for virtue,
and broadly construed consists of four truths: the existence of God, the dis-
tinction between mind and body, the immensity of the universe, and the
interconnectedness of the universe (Letter to Princess Elizabeth 15 Septem-
ber 1645, AT IV: 291-3/CSMK: 265-6). The first two truths are metaphysical,
the latter two fall under natural and moral philosophy. Let us focus on the
39
first two truths. According to Descartes, S needs to know that God exists
and that everything in existence is a manifestation of God’s will, and S must
also know that the mind is distinct and more noble than the body in order
to regulate our passions and exercise virtue (Ibid.). These two metaphysical
truths are grounded in clear and distinct perceptions (redacted).
If S did not know these truths, Descartes would say it’s impossible for S
to exercise virtue, and thus she would be incapable of acquiring virtue and
happiness, at least in their ideal forms (Dedicatory Letter to Elizabeth, AT
VIIIA: 3/CSM I: 191). This implies that if God were to deceive S about say,
the real distinction between mind and body, then He would be preventing S
from acquiring ideal virtue and happiness—a clear harm. As such, intellectual
deception is inconsistent with God’s benevolent nature.
3.3.2 The Dream Doubt
Descartes’ resolution of the dream doubt also depends on the claim that
God is not a deceiver. The dream doubt in the First Meditation is that S
has no reliable way of distinguishing waking states from dream states, and
is specifically designed to cast doubt on our certainty in the existence of
external bodies. At the end of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes claims that S
can distinguish between waking states and dream states: “I now notice that
there is a vast di↵erence between the two, in that dreams are never linked by
memory with all the other actions of life as waking experiences are” (Sixth
Meditation, AT VII: 89/CSM II: 61). Since God is not a deceiver, and S now
knows that memory is reliable, I can rely on reports of memory (as well as
other faculties) to verify whether I am in a waking state.
That God is a non-malicious deceiver causes no problem here. For if God
were to deceive S about the existence of bodies, he would be harming S,
for she would be out of touch with reality, which would cause psychological
harm.25 The psychological harm induced by not being in touch with reality is
25Notice that if the dream doubt cannot be resolved, then we risk not being in touch with
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brought out at the end of the First Meditation, where the meditator expresses
“dread” and “fear” in the face of the “inextricable darkness of the problems
I have now raised” (First Meditation, AT VII: 23/CSM II: 15). If Descartes
could not resolve the dream doubt, much of these passions and thoughts
would persist, yielding a psychologically and practically harmful state of
a↵airs, preventing S from living a psychologically healthy life.
3.3.3 The Proof of the External World
Descartes’ proof of the external world is handled in the same way. The proof is
a disjunctive syllogism (Stuart 1986: 22). Either my ideas of material objects
are caused by (i) some unknown faculty of the mind, (ii) God, or (iii) by
actual material objects. Yet my ideas of material objects are neither caused
by (i) some unknown faculty of the mind, nor (ii) by God. Hence, they must
be caused by (iii) actual material objects. Now the sub-argument against (ii)
appeals to God’s non-deceptiveness (Sixth Meditation, AT VII: 79-80/CSM
II: 55), but clearly all that’s relevant here when it comes to the argument’s
validity is God’s non-deceptiveness with respect to the existence of external
bodies. Yet as we have seen, perceiving us in that respect is malicious.
4 Conclusion
Descartes is committed to Sensory Deception. This thesis, plus facts
about our sensory system, entails that God is a deceiver. But when properly
understood in terms of non-malicious deception, Descartes can admit all of
this. His broader system remains intact. Yet we are required to rethink how
to approach that system.
reality at all. Of course, there is a sense in which color sensations leave us out of touch with
reality, but they nonetheless will accurately represent other properties of bodies besides
colors. Color sensations are illusions, and it’s a conceptual truth that illusions (unlike
hallucinations) make us aware of the objects they represent.
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The line ‘God is not a deceiver’ is canonical as the theoretical linchpin
of the Meditations. We don’t deny that presentational simplifications are
often permissible if not advisable, especially for the uninitiated, as when
teaching courses that serve to introduce philosophy in general or early modern
philosophy in particular. But not all simplifications are equal, and in the
present case, not only is the line false—in fact, God is a deceiver—once we
take the aforementioned lesson to heart, we see that deception per se need
not be at the foundation of Descartes’ system.
The Meditations contains two theodicies: the epistemic theodicy of the
Fourth Meditation and the sensory theodicy of the Sixth Meditation. In the
Fourth Meditation, Descartes needs to resolve the epistemic worry that God
might deceive us in our clear and distinct perceptions, which would preclude
us from acquiring scientia. Having completed the Fourth Meditation, it’s
tempting to attribute to Descartes the view that God can never be responsible
for our forming any kind of false judgments. The problem is that this makes
a consistent sensory theodicy in the Sixth Meditation impossible. For in the
Sixth Replies, Descartes clarifies his account of our sensory systems so as
to make clear that they include c-judgments: will-issued, irrevisable, false
sensory judgments. However, if we see Descartes as being primarily concerned
with benevolence, the tension dissipates. For now the Fourth Meditation in
fact teaches us that God cannot be responsible for us forming any harmful
judgments. That’s bedrock. And since false r-judgments about clear and
distinct perceptions would be harmful, they cannot be due to God. However,
the standards for harm in the sensory theodicy of the Sixth Meditation are
di↵erent. C-judgments are not harmful on account of their being false, but
they are beneficial for our health in virtue of the way they represent bodies.
So God, in causing us to have c-judgments, is both a deceiver and benevolent.
What’s ironic is that it takes realizing that God is a deceiver to properly see
the theoretical centrality a↵orded to benevolence within Descartes’ system.
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